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How does clientelism affect policy-making? Can patrons in government discard groups of 
clients in order to pursue reforms in conditions of crisis? The article argues that 
clientelism goes beyond the exchange of votes and may permeate organizations with the 
capacity for collective action such as labour unions. This merger gives rise to a clientelist-
collective system that changes both patron–client relations and the context of collective 
action with important implications for the design of economic policy. As evidence from 
Greece shows, patrons in government are better off avoiding reforms that deprive their 
client groups of collective and personal benefits (clientelist bias in policy-making). Labour 
unions infiltrated by party clients have weak autonomy from the patron party but, 
operating inside the party network, they can effectively safeguard their access to club 
goods. Interdependent preferences and organizational linkages between the patron party 
and its client organizations favour collaboration and co-optation over open confrontation 
in policy-making processes. 
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Introduction  
 
The relationship between clientelism and policy-making needs further analysis and 
empirical substantiation. Recent research has observed a significant association between 
clientelism and fiscal consolidation under economic crisis (Afonso, Zartaloudis and 
Papadopoulos 2015) and between clientelism and structural reforms (Trantidis 2014), but 
the explanatory link between the two phenomena remains under-theorized. While party 
clients can use their vote to reward or punish their patrons (Pappas 2014: 44-51; Afonso, 
Zartaloudis and Papadopoulos 2015), politicians facing tough economic conditions may 
discard some client groups for policies that could secure the system's sustainability and, 
possibly, broader electoral popularity (Geddes 1994: 95). However, patron-client relations 
extend beyond the trade-off of votes. Clientelism can permeate labour unions and other 
professional groups and blend with typical structures of collective action, generating a 
hybrid system of interest intermediation. More attention must be paid to the properties of 
this system - how it differs from both typical clientelism and the conventional interest-
group schema  and how it shapes the context of policy preference formation.  
 
This article indicates that the special position of the unions as client groups generates 
party-union interdependencies and shared interests that limit the degree of government 
autonomy and favours a policy bias towards protecting the status of unionized client 
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groups during a reform process. This is shown in the interplay between PASOK 
(Panhellenic Socialist Party) and its affiliated unions over a period of 20 years (1985-
2004) in Greece. With a highly clientelist party system1  Greece is a 'pilot case' for theory 
development (Eckstein 2000) and offers a ‘tough test’ for the resilience of this system 
when deteriorating macroeconomic imbalances since 1985 exerted strong pressure on 
Greek governments to consider reform options that could harm the status of unionized 
party clients, such as privatization, the closure of ailing state-owned companies, lay-offs, 
and the restructuring of employment terms in the broader public sector.2  
 
The article combines a macro-structural study of a clientelist system with the analysis of 
this institutional setting. In this account, actors respond rationally to the incentives they 
face, and these incentives are inferred from the empirical context in which they are 
situated (Boettke et al 2005:290; Pierson 2000:72). This allows research to trace stable 
relationships connecting social and economic actors in a given setting and infer their 
recurrent effect on preferences. When some of these features are seen as 'social capital' in 
a given location (Cf. Tsakalotos and Lyberaki 2002), they are detached from a discussion 
of institutionally embedded incentives, which could better explain their reproduction and 
resilience. Historical observations can be clustered in patterns of behaviour and explained 
by an incentive-based analysis (Bates et al. 1998: 10-13). The analytic narrative does not 
generate deterministic conclusions (Levi 2002: 122-124) but helps build ‘contingent 
generalizations' (George and Bennett 2005:81, 84) which research can further explore in 
other case-studies (Gerring 2004:349).  
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Clientelism and the context of collective action and policy-making 
 
Clientelism - the allocation of benefits by political actors (patrons) to political supporters 
(clients) in return for their support (Piattoni 2001: 4; Stokes 2007: 605) - is seen as ‘a 
vertical, dyadic alliance between people of unequal status, power and resources’ (Landé 
1977: xx). The typical view is that clients are subjected to hierarchical controls (Scott 
1972:92; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984:48; Medina and Stokes 2007). Part of the literature 
maintains that clientelism deprives voters of their ability to effectively hold politicians 
accountable (Stokes 2005). This imbalance persists when party supporters are integrated 
in networks (Roniger and Güneş-Ayata 1994; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 8, 17-19). 
Clientelist networks are not regarded as ‘proper groups’, but they are seen as ‘action-sets’ 
of members who are hierarchically connected to party leadership (Scott 1972: 97; Chubb, 
1982:27, 246; Kitschelt, 2000; Wantchekon, 2003). Clients still have heterogeneous and 
mutually antagonistic preferences. When patrons offer club goods, i.e. a benefit that is 
shared by its members (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), they are driven not by the clients’ 
organizational capacity, but because they value their clients as voters and campaign 
resources. Unlike typical interest groups, client groups lack the organizational capacity, 
autonomy and shared preferences to take collective action beyond what their patrons 
require or allow. When the literature observed cases of collective action by client groups, 
these were exceptional cases in which actions were either validated by the patrons 
themselves (Auyero et al. 2009) or came as protest by small communities that were 
adequately connected to the outside economy (Shami 2012: 603). 
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It is worth exploring, however, how patron-client relationships are redefined when clients 
are organized in labour unions and other civic or professional associations (LaPalompara 
1964; Graziano 1978:297) and how the merger of clientelism with structures of collective 
action affects the bargaining power and the degree of autonomy of the actors involved. 
The nature of relations that develop may go beyond the parameters of conventional 
clientelist exchange. As party clients infiltrate these organizations they gain access to an 
infrastructure for collective organization that retains its formal autonomy. Clients who 
enter labour unions or other professional organizations share an occupational status that 
generates common interests upon which to organize collective action. As a result, they can 
interact with patrons and the patron party not only in their capacity as individual clients, 
but also collectively through organizations that promote common policy preferences. 
Unlike atomized clients in typical patronage networks, they can establish a regular and 
formal relationship with political power and bargain to secure access to club goods. They 
can offer coordinated support to individual politicians or the party provided they satisfy 
their collective demands.  
 
This hybrid system of interest intermediation also differs from the typical interest-group 
schema in several aspects. Clients who are members of formal organizations are 
personally tied to patronage networks. Unlike typical interest groups, the autonomy of 
unions and other formal associations permeated by clientelist ties is weakened by their 
interpersonal relation to patrons. While organized clients obtain the capacity for collective 
action, typical patronage controls maintain personal power asymmetry and hierarchy. 
Accountability, however, is strengthened by the symbiotic relationship between patrons 
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and the party leadership, as they both depend on the electoral success of the patron party 
and its access to power. For patrons, clientelism serves as a solution to the problems of 
party organization and cohesion; for clients, electoral success secures access to selective 
benefits, both as individual clients and as members of the politically affiliated client 
group. As a result, the clientelist-collective system shares elements from both typical 
interest-group activity and the typical patron-client framework but exhibits idiosyncrasies, 
as summarized in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Distinct properties of typical clients, organized client groups and non-client 
groups 
 
Typical clients  Organized client groups Typical organized groups  
Source of 
association 
with political 
power 
Clientelist exchange Clientelist exchange and 
occupational and social 
affiliation in  a formal 
organization 
Occupational or other 
affiliation in  a formal 
organization 
Demand from 
political power 
Regular or one-off access to 
resources as ‘private goods’ 
through typical clientelist 
exchange 
Regular access to resources as 
‘private goods’ through typical 
clientelist exchange, and  
access to ‘club goods’ for the 
group through collective 
action 
Regular or one-off access to 
‘club goods’ through 
collective action, which 
includes public advocacy and 
lobbying, and possibly’ 
explicit or implicit agreement 
on particular issues (one-off or 
repeated)  
 
Supply to Individual engagement in Individual and collective At times, political or policy 
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political power political activism, direct 
involvement in political 
campaign, public 
demonstration of political 
affiliation 
political activism, direct 
involvement in political 
campaign, public 
demonstration of political 
affiliation as clients; at times, 
political or policy 
endorsements as collective 
organization 
endorsements depending on 
the type of organization, 
or/and financial support 
Organizational 
capacity  
No, unless requested and 
directed by the patron 
Yes, through typical collective 
action and through party-
affiliated political activism 
Yes, through typical collective 
action  
Preferences Interdependency with patrons Interdependency with the 
patron party as groups of 
clients, which affects the 
configuration of the 
organization's preferences  
Independence; preference may 
coincide or intersect with 
political parties or the 
government 
Organizational 
autonomy 
No Limited because of members’ 
clientelist ties to the party, 
creating interdependent policy 
preferences 
Yes: occasional formal or 
informal associations with 
political agents may be built, 
preserved or broken on the 
basis of convergent or 
divergent preferences 
Bargaining 
power 
Limited because of collective 
action problems yet clientelist 
networks are valuable to 
patrons 
Considerable thanks to 
organizational capacity and the 
significance of the group as 
political resource for the party 
leadership and patron 
politicians; yet constrained by 
Varies depending on 
organizational capacity, 
lobbying resources (including 
media access and money) and 
scope for shifting alliances 
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the cost of defection for 
individual clients and by co-
optation tactics by the central 
party targeting clients 
 
 
The special properties of this clientelist-collective system are not fully captured by 
analytical frameworks that neglect the context-specific nature of policy-related bargaining. 
Typical and, quite often, formal analysis assumes that interest groups and the government 
have considerable autonomy from one another in terms of preferences and bargaining 
capacity, and that outcomes are largely determined by relative inter-group power (Krueger 
1974; Becker 1983; Alesina and Drazen 1991; Schamis 1999). In the context of 
clientelism, however, the presumption of autonomy underrates the overlapping roles that 
emerge inside the broader party-client nexus: organized clients are both members of the 
organized group and party clients, union leaders are also senior party cadres, while party 
politicians are both policymakers and the patrons of these client groups. This symbiotic 
relationship - built upon the long-term exchange of mutual personal and collective benefits 
- makes the pattern of collective action in a clientelist system more intricate in terms of 
preference formation and the source of bargaining power. Benefit-distribution is here a 
process internal to the broader party-client network. Patron-client relationships strengthen 
the value patrons place in the collective demands of their clients who are situated at the 
heart of the clientelist network. Patrons are better off tackling any policy grievances by 
these groups with a view to a mutually accommodating settlement in order to avoid losses 
in party cohesion and support. Clientelist linkages also moderate the way labour unions 
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articulate policy preferences and claim collective goals from decision-makers who are at 
the same time their patrons. Patrons can use selective patronage benefits to persuade union 
leaders to adopt a more lenient stance towards their policies, especially unionists with 
aspirations to enter central politics.  
 
The impact of clientelist ties on policy-making and collective action is comparable but not 
identical to the ideological-partisan linkage between trade unions and social democratic 
political parties. Although there are strong incentives for policy alignment in both cases, 
reciprocity in the clientelist-partisan linkage is both personal and group-level, largely 
dependent on the provision of both club goods and private-clientelist goods. The distinct 
microfoundations of reciprocity in the clientelist-partisan linkage have a different impact 
on the nature of policy claims and the source of the unions' bargaining strength and, in the 
broader context of inter-party competition, skew policy-making differently.  
 
First, both the nature of policy concessions that client groups ask and the nature of 
compensation that government must offer, once reforms are under way, are different. In 
Sweden, for instance, economic policies since the 1970s distanced the social democrats 
from the trade unions but informal ties were maintained thanks to compensatory 
concessions to private sector workers that involved welfare and retraining policies (Cf. 
Upchurch et al. 2009: 9). In the UK, the clash between the Labour Party and the trade 
unions in the late 1970s primarily regarded wages (Minkin 1992). By contrast, claims in a 
clientelist system, where labour unions primarily consist of broader public sector 
employees, revolve around the provision of special privileges that distinguish these 
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employees from private-sector workers (creating dual working standards). Similarly, 
compensation needs not involve comprehensive welfare and training opportunities for all 
employees. but it has to protect, in sight of restructuring and privatization policies, the 
privileges broader public sector employees enjoy and the turf for individual favouritism. 
 
Second, because clients in the broader state sector are animated by specific clientelist 
benefits and not so much by general concessions offered to all workers in the private and 
public sector, they are less keen to object to general policies towards fiscal consolidation 
and structural reforms, provided that their privileges both as individuals and organized 
groups are preserved. Labour union militancy is discouraged thanks to patron-client ties 
connecting union members, unionists and the party. On the other side, given the different 
nature of concessions at stake, clientelist patrons do not face a fierce dilemma between 
implementing reforms generally restricting welfare and distribution but losing the support 
of the unions, on the one hand, or refusing to reform the welfare state to keep the unions 
as allies but risking losing voters, on the other (Kitschelt 2004: 133). The kind of dilemma 
clientelist parties face is about preserving special benefits to core supporters under 
economic hard times, which requires a tailored-made approach to the design of reforms.  
 
Third, although in the case of the UK, the unions' demands over wages came to be seen by 
the Labour Party’s leadership as an electoral liability (Mcllroy 2002) while in most social 
democratic settings unions and parties preserved some organizational and sociological ties 
(Jacoby and Behrens 2014), in the clientelist setting, there are stronger incentives that 
foster political alignment on both interpersonal and group level. Client unions and the 
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patron party have stronger interdependencies that make detachment too costly in the 
context of inter-party competition. A government party that withdraws the supply of club 
goods to a client group will risk its ties with that group and could undermine the cohesion 
and vitality of its campaign support network. Unionists, on their side, should not overlook 
their role as intermediaries in the patronage network. Hierarchy and control over members 
of the broader clientelist network limit the scope for client unionists to express discontent 
against their host political party. As a result, interpersonal linkages, preference 
interdependencies and the distinct source of bargaining power have important implications 
for the type of policies the patron party must preferably adopt when in government:  
 
  1)  When economic reforms have to be implemented, the government will be 
better off adjusting its reforms to protect patronage supply to its client groups in order to 
avoid within-party clashes and defections (policy bias in favour of preserving clientelist 
supply). 
 
 2) The above-mentioned concessions (collaboration) and the co-optation of 
unionists inside the broader clientelist network can prevent confrontation between the 
patron party and its affiliated unions during a general programme of economic adjustment. 
 
As the table below illustrates, a patron party in government (G) has the options of either 
ignoring the unions or compromising on its policy to avoid confrontation with the unions. 
Unions inhabited by client groups (U) have the options of confronting the government 
openly or showing complacency. In a clientelist system, for both players, option A 
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(ignore, confrontation) leads to mutual losses: a clash will undermine the party’s cohesion 
and mobilization capacity and possibly bring electoral defeat that will equally jeopardize 
the clients’ access to private and club goods. A patron party in government will be better 
off implementing a policy agenda that would cause the least possible damage to the 
party’s cohesion. For the party, compromise with the unions makes sense as it expects that 
they will reciprocate with a moderate level of protest against general reform policies. For 
the unions, a complacent stance towards the government is the preferred option insofar as 
the government is sensitive to their demands as a client group and adjusts its economic 
policy to protect their core interests.  
 
 
Table 2:  Strategic interactions between government and unions in a clientelist 
system 
 Patron party in government (G) 
Ignore Compromise 
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s 
as
 c
li
en
t 
g
ro
u
p
s 
(U
) 
Confrontation A. Bilateral losses 
U: Loss in policy  
preferences 
and  damage to 
special party ties 
 
 
G: Policy preferences 
attained but damage to its 
ties to the unions with 
implications for party 
cohesion and 
mobilization capacity  
B. Bilateral losses 
U: Gaining policy 
concessions 
but causing 
damage to 
special party ties 
 
 
G: Loss in fully 
attaining policy 
preferences through the 
prescribed policies. 
Damage to party 
cohesion and 
mobilization capacity  
 
Complacency  C. Bilateral losses 
U:  Loss in policy  
preferences, tension 
among union members 
over complacency 
with government policy 
 
G: Policy preferences 
attained. Maintaining 
social peace, but possible 
losses of clients with 
implications for party 
cohesion and strong 
mobilization capacity  
D. Mutual gains 
U: Compromise  
in general policy 
concessions 
but preservation  
of club goods and 
individual 
benefits 
G: Loss in fully 
attaining policy 
preferences through the 
prescribed policies. 
Maintaining social 
peace, party cohesion 
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 and strong 
mobilization capacity  
 
 
 
The clientelist system and its policy implications in Greece 
 
In Greece, patron-client relationships infiltrated labour unions and redefined their 
relationship with political power. Following the fall of the military junta in 1974, centre-
right New Democracy and the socialist PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Party) massively 
appointed party clients in the broader public sector, which included the state monopolies 
in electricity, telecommunications, transport, water and sewage, ports, and radio and 
television as well as many other commercial enterprises in petrol, defence, shipyards and 
cement. By the mid-1980s PASOK had developed the strongest client network among the 
employees of the broader public sector.3 Through its sectoral organizations (kladikes), it 
came to control most labour unions and two main umbrella labour-union associations: the 
Confederation of Civil Servants (ADEDY) that represented public administration 
employees and the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) that represented the 
unions of the private sector and the state-owned sector of the economy (Lyrintzis 1984; 
Spourdalakis 1988; Sotiropoulos, 1996; Lavdas 2005; Lyrintzis, 2005; Matsaganis 2007; 
Pappas, 2009). Union members in the broader public sector could claim both individual 
favours as clients and collective goods as a group, such as wages higher than the private 
sector, generous pension schemes, early retirement options, extra benefits and holidays. At 
the same time, inside the party’s affiliated labour organizations, ‘free-riding’ behaviour 
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and dissent could be easily identified (Sotiropoulos 1996: 61). PASOK’s leader Andreas 
Papandreou kept a tight grip on the party’s labour organizations by frequently expelling 
leaders whose behaviour showed signs of factionalism and autonomy. This tactic sent a 
message to PASOK’s union leaders that their career inside the party network was 
dependent on the endorsement of the party leadership.  
 
This direction of the labour movement can be situated in the broader 'parentela pluralism' 
framework of state-society relations in Greece (Pagoulatos 2003: 161-167) where various 
associations direct their demands to the government party. This structure is highly 
fragmented and therefore, less capable of conducting a broader social dialogue on general 
policies (See 'disjointed corporatism' by Lavdas 2005). Nevertheless, despite their 
fragmentation, the unions - largely inhabited by broader public sector employees - were 
integrated in centralized party machines (Lyrintzis 1984; Mavrogordatos 1997) and 
formed part of a broader party-clientelist network. Clientelist association with political 
power created 'unity in fragmentation' under a set of incentives and informal norms 
governing the provision of sector-specific 'club' benefits. This pattern of collective 
organization and interest intermediation created a recurrent policy bias towards the supply 
and preservation of club goods to client groups. The distinct impact on the design of 
economic policy in Greece is noticeable in the period between the mid-1980s and the mid-
2000s, during which macroeconomic imbalances and increasing institutional pressures 
from the European Union (EU) pushed consecutive Greek governments to launch 
economic reforms. Among the policy options available, structural reforms in the broader 
public sector and the privatization of state-owned companies were key policies 
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recommended by international organizations (European Commission 1998: 13; 2000: 31; 
OECD 2001: 9, 12, 31, 84, 114, 116) as part of fiscal stabilization programmes and in 
response to EU law on market liberalization, state aid and competition (Clifton et al. 2003; 
Pagoulatos 2005: 360). These policies, however, threatened to considerably harm the 
status of PASOK’s unionized clients and, in the following years, tested the relationship 
between party leadership and the labour unions of the broader public sector.  
 
The literature covering PASOK’s reform policies during this period has focused on 
episodes of confrontation between the government and the labour unions which had 
initially divergent preferences over specific reform proposals and effectively blocked 
reform efforts (Pagoulatos 2003; Lavdas 2005; Tinios 2005; Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos 
2006; 2011; Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008). Here the interaction between unions 
and the government is couched in the typical language of interest groups versus the 
government. However, if labour unions acted as ‘veto-players’ that blocked deep-cutting 
structural reforms, the source of the unions' remarkably strong bargaining power remains 
theoretically and empirically under-explored. It is puzzling how these groups could hinder 
policy initiatives given the electoral success and parliamentary majority of the self-
proclaimed ‘modernizing’ government of Prime Minister Simitis (1995-2004). At the 
same time, Greece came under strong pressures to implement economic reforms, most 
prominently, binding EU Directives, mechanisms of policy surveillance, and the urgent 
need to fix its finances to avoid exclusion from the Eurozone and a loss of 
creditworthiness. Entry to the European Monetary Union (EMU) was an important 
benchmark for the Simitis government but the Maastricht criteria and the Stability Pact 
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allowed it some scope to design its policy mix. Focusing on confrontation episodes does 
not disclose important information about how the party-union linkage shaped PASOK’s 
overall mix of economic policy and pre-empted further clashes throughout the period in 
which PASOK was under consistent pressure to reform the Greek economy (1985-80 and 
1993-2004).  
 
The overview of economic policy under PASOK and of party-union relations inside 
PASOK's broader support network offers better insight into the workings of the clientelist 
system and its impact on policy-making. We can distinguish variations with regard to 
PASOK's ties with the unions and its choice of policies: open confrontation, coordination 
with co-optation and contained confrontation. In each pattern we observe the dynamic 
interaction between PASOK's policies and the relationship between the party and its 
affiliated unions. Open confrontation between the party and leading party unionists led to 
mutual losses when in 1985 the re-elected PASOK government responded to a balance of 
payment crisis with a wage freeze and austerity measures, causing a rift inside the labour 
union movement. PASOK ultimately abandoned its programme earlier than announced 
and sought to restore its ties with the labour unions in the run-up to the 1989 election. 
Returning to power in 1993 PASOK excluded full privatization from its stabilization 
programme and abstained from implementing comprehensive structural reforms that could 
harm the status of the unionized employees of the broader public sector (collaboration 
with co-optation). Policy adaptation by PASOK did not prevent occasional outbursts of 
dissent over specific policy reforms from party unionists but the scale of their reactions 
was constrained to avoid undermining PASOK’s cohesion (contained confrontation). 
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Open confrontation (1985-1987) 
 
Chronic problems of the Greek economy led to a current account crisis in 1985 soon after 
the general election. The re-elected PASOK government announced a stabilization 
programme with a general wage freeze and rising taxes together with currency 
devaluation. The programme, however, excluded privatization, market deregulation, the 
closure of ailing state-owned companies and reductions in the size of state sector 
employment (OECD 1987: 20; OECD 1992: 182-3), which would have hit public sector 
employees. These groups were spared from permanent losses in their status but, just as 
workers in the private sector, they suffered income losses due to the wage freeze under a 
double digit inflation. The sudden announcement of austerity came as a shock to the 
labour unions whose members and leaders expected PASOK to meet its pre-electoral 
pledge for a generous wage policy. A section of PASOK’s loyal unionists reacted to 
PASOK’s stabilization, defected from the party organization and aligned with Communist 
Party unionists in an attempt to take control of the GSEE. The government appointed 
compliant unionists in their place. However, tensions inside the PASOK support basis and 
growing public dissatisfaction with austerity led Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou to 
end the stabilization programme earlier than scheduled. PASOK relaxed its fiscal policy 
and resumed patronage appointments before the 1989 election.4 PASOK wanted to restore 
and strengthen its alliance with these groups in view of the coming general election. 
PASOK’s unionists realigned with the party to preserve their access to both individual 
privileges and ‘club goods’. Despite the policy U-turn, the confrontation between PASOK 
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and its unionists led to mutual losses and contributed to PASOK’s electoral defeat and the 
election of a government much less attached to the unions. This clash offered a useful 
lesson for ensuing PASOK governments about the politically optimal design of economic 
policy from the perspective of a patron party and suggested that collaboration is the 
optimal strategy in designing economic reform (As in table 2 above).  
 
Coordination with co-optation (1993-2000) 
 
Despite its pre-electoral commitments to abandon fiscal austerity, PASOK returning to 
power in 1993 pursued fiscal consolidation with a combination of higher taxes and tight 
monetary policy. It also halted the privatization programme which the previous 
government had announced. In 1995, the newly elected Prime Minister Costas Simitis 
proclaimed the desire to secure Greece's entry to the EMU by 1999. His policy heavily 
relied on direct taxes and implemented gradual and relatively mild structural reforms in 
the labour market and the pension system. Most of his economic policies spread the fiscal 
cost of economic adjustment across the population while protecting the employment status 
of the unionized employees of the broader public sector (Table 3). The nature of the 
economic adjustment was such that it caused, for the most part, mild reactions from the 
politically-affiliated labour unions. However, the prospect of privatization, particularly of 
the utility companies in telecommunications, electricity and water supply, became a 
constant source of concern for public sector employees and their unions. To prevent 
serious reactions, the government reassured that only minority shares would be sold 
through flotation while the management of the public utilities companies would stay in the 
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hands of the state. These enterprises were also protected from competition through 
informal barriers that essentially prevented the entry of competitors in the same markets 
(OECD 2001:16, 30 and 95). The employees of these corporations secured permanent 
tenure and generous retirement benefits and pension plans. In addition, the government 
offered part of the privatization proceeds to the staff’s social security funds (Börsch-Supan 
and Tinios 2001: 404-5). Older employees were also offered the option of early 
retirement. For the remaining employees, average wages in public enterprises grew faster 
than wages in the private sector. New employees were hired under different employment 
terms, often as temporary contract workers or trainees, which allowed the companies' 
management some flexibility in organizing their workforce. This ‘dualism’ in employment 
terms between a highly protected old guard of employees and new employees with largely 
fragmented employment terms was a clear indication of the way the government sought to 
modernize public sector enterprises without undermining the ties with its unionized 
clients.  
 
 
Table 3: Pattern of economic adjustment in Greece during the second PASOK 
government (1993-2004) 
Horizontal diffusion of adjustment costs Favouritism towards client groups 
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 Rising taxation (both direct and indirect) 
 Currency devaluation (in 1998)  
 Tight monetary policy (1993-1998) affecting 
export industries  
 Limited reform of public enterprises and 
organizations 
 High tax burden of employment and high 
national security contributions 
 Failure to cut subsidies to ailing public sector 
enterprises (Olympic Airways, state 
television, railways) 
 Wage restraint in the private sector (1997-
2000) 
 Increase in the bills of public utility 
companies 
 Increased public borrowing  both nominally 
and as a percentage of GDP 
 Assumption by the government of the debt of 
state-owned banks, agricultural cooperatives 
and public corporations (mainly through state 
guarantees  
 Subsidies to pension funds 
 Subsidies to deficit-running public 
enterprises and their pension funds 
 Failure to modernize or privatize deficit-
running enterprises 
 Indirect protectionism of the monopoly 
status of government-controlled 
corporations (in violation of EC law) 
 Privileged terms of employment (wage 
benefits, early retirement, retirement 
bonus for public sector employees 
 Generous retirement schemes in 
modernization plans for several state-
owned enterprises  
 Fiscal benefits to public sector employees 
in the form of overtime payment, 
compensation for extracurricular activities, 
such as participation in various 
committees and travelling expenses 
 
 
 
Party unionists declared their opposition to any reform plans that could negatively affect 
the status of their members, such as the full-scale privatization of state-owned companies. 
At the same time, they valued the ties they had cultivated inside the party network and 
refrained from reacting strongly against the government's stabilization programme. Both 
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party unionists and party politicians shared an interest in PASOK’s electoral success. 
Confrontation was kept at bay to avoid further escalation that could hurt the party unity 
and undermine PASOK’s chances for re-election. Overall, informal clientelist ties 
connecting ministers, managers and unionists in the broader public sector limited the 
scope of reforms in the broader public sector (Spanou 2008: 161).  
 
These party-union linkages also helped tone down the scale and nature of reactions over 
specific policy measures. Engagement with PASOK gave client employees the 
opportunity to enjoy extra benefits and good work placements in the broader public sector 
and offered unionists the prospect of a career in central politics. This pattern of policy co-
ordination and co-optation was manifested in the small scale of the rallies and protests 
organized by the unions despite the prolonged austerity programme (Vima, 3 November 
1996; Kathimerini, 1 July 2001). A Social Pact was signed in 1997, which committed 
unions to wage moderation and social dialogue in return for important concessions in 
employment law. The unions’ mild response to government policies was unprecedented 
given the prior history of labour activism in Greece.5 However, the relationship between 
the government and its affiliated unionists remained delicate and depended on mutual 
interest accommodation. In this context, party unionists had to keep a delicate balance 
between acting as labour representatives and conforming to the role of party cadres who 
were expected to support government policy. A statement by PASOK’s union leader 
epitomizes this relationship:  
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‘I have never hidden the fact that I belong to PASOK. Nor am I hiding the fact that 
I have supported, I do support and will continue to support President Simitis. Of 
course, this does not mean that I will not react if the government attempts to hurt 
our acquired rights’ (Vima, 5 April 1998, emphasis added). 
 
Contained confrontation (2001-2002) 
 
Despite efforts for policy co-ordination and co-optation, the PASOK government did not 
avoid confrontation with the labour unions over specific policy initiatives. The full sale of 
a middle-sized bank, Ioniki, in 1998 tested the relationship between PASOK and its 
affiliated unions. Although the government reassured the employees that the new terms of 
employment would prevent future lay-offs, PASOK-affiliated unionists outside this bank 
saw the privatization as a breach of PASOK’s policy commitments (Nea, 12 May 1998). 
At the same time, criticism inside the Cabinet targeted the way the Ministry of the 
Economy handled the union’s reactions (Nea, 1 June 1996). As a way out, the government 
presented the full sale of Ioniki as an isolated case and rejected proposals for broader 
structural reforms and full privatizations in an effort to appease the unions and prevent 
general unrest (Nea, 16 March 1998). 
 
A second and most serious round of labour unrest broke up in 2002 in reaction to 
proposals to reform the pension system that would have changed several of the terms of 
retirement for public and private sector employees. The leaders of GSEE and ADEDY, 
who were also senior PASOK members, rebelled against the reform plan with a scale of 
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public protests that demonstrated clearly that these unions had retained a solid 
mobilization capacity. The protests forced the government to pass a moderate reform of 
the pension system (Matsaganis 2002). Several PASOK’s unionists sought to reinstate 
their role as intermediaries between their members and the party and became overtly 
critical of the government’s economic policy.6 In response, Prime Minister Simitis 
cancelled a number of scheduled reforms and called an early party conference in an 
attempt to reconcile with the unions and elicit a vote of confidence from numerous party 
factions. In the run-up to the conference, a generous ‘social package’ of welfare policies 
and wage increases in the public sector were announced. At the conference, party 
unionists expressed concerns about the direction of government policy but did not 
challenge Simitis as the party leader. Party unity was the recurrent slogan of the 
conference, echoing the shared desire of the party base and the affiliated unionists to keep 
PASOK in power.7 Prime Minister Simitis comfortably won the conference ballot and 
received public reassurances from the party’s leading unionists in support of PASOK’s 
cohesion. These episodes were useful in reconfirming that compromise between the 
government and the unions was the optimal strategic choice for both sides, congruent with 
the lessons of their previous confrontation in 1985 (As table 2 shows).  
 
The three patterns of government-unions interactions (Table 4) reveal the idiosyncrasies of 
policy-making and collective action in Greece's clientelist system in view of mutual 
commitments and shared interests by political patrons and their client groups. PASOK's 
macroeconomic stabilization did not shy away from unpopular measures such as 
increasing taxation,8  but it made limited progress with structural reforms that could have 
25 
 
curbed government spending and could have reduced the need to raise new revenue. The 
cost of macroeconomic stabilization was horizontally diffused across the population while 
noticeable adjustments in structural reforms protected the core interests of PASOK’s client 
groups in the broader public sector. This reform pattern substantiates policy bias in favour 
of preserving the supply of club goods to client groups, in view of interdependent 
preferences between PASOK and its affiliated unions: they were both better off following 
a strategy of policy collaboration in the design of policies and, in cases of initial 
divergence of preferences, co-optation and mutual compromise. 'Clientelist bias' may also 
be observed in New Democracy's reform record before the 2009 crisis, this time 
concerning the protection from liberalization policies of its main body of supporters in 
professional associations, even though the Greek centre-right party had fewer attachments 
to public sector unions (Trantidis 2014) and proceeded with the full privatization of the 
state telecommunications enterprise (OTE) and several banks when it returned to power 
(2004-2009). Finally, the shrinking of distributional politics during the crisis period may 
be seen as a key reason behind's PASOK's electoral collapse and New Democracy's 
relative decline.   
 
Table 4: Interaction between client groups and the patron party 
 
Open confrontation Coordination with co-
optation 
Contained 
confrontation 
Policy  Austerity measures and 
incomes policy by the 
party in government 
Austerity measures, 
fiscal policy and partial 
privatization by the 
Full privatization and 
comprehensive plan for 
pensions reform by the 
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(1985-1987)  party in government 
(1993-2004) 
party in government 
(1998, 2001) 
Client-group response Internal splits and 
confrontation with the 
party in government 
followed by defections 
of top-level unionists 
 
Implicit collaboration 
and co-optation of 
unionists by the party,   
Clash with the party in 
government  but with 
no defections, leading 
to policy compromise 
Party stance toward its 
client groups 
Initially intransigent, 
with the expulsion of 
dissenters coupled with 
co-optation of 
complacent union 
leaders  
Sensitive to group 
claims and eager to 
adjust its policy; co-
optation through career 
promotions 
Initially intransigent but 
later willing to 
negotiate and 
compromise 
Outcome Mutual losses and 
abandonment of the 
programme later 
(November 1987) 
Mutual gains 
Partial reforms, fiscal 
stabilization and mostly 
partial privatizations in 
which the management 
remained under state 
control and the  
employment privileges 
were safeguarded  
Risk of mutual losses 
prevented 
 
Compromise on a 
watered-down reform 
plan followed by ‘social 
package’ concessions to 
the unions 
Impact on the client-
group 
Splits in the union: 
political isolation of 
defectors  
Preservation of ties 
with the party 
Reassertion of relative 
autonomy against the 
central party  
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Impact on the party Tensions within the 
party, overcome by the 
abandonment of 
austerity 
Smooth implementation 
of the government’s 
economic programme 
Tensions within the 
party, overcome by the 
abandonment of the 
initial plan and the 
adoption of a 
compromised package 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Policy-making is shaped by the institutional setting in which they are embedded. Party 
clients can become members of organizations endowed with resources and institutional 
autonomy, such as labour unions, and can take collective action to safeguard both the 
benefits they enjoy by virtue of their membership in the unions and the turf for patronage 
as individual clients. Compared to the typical framework of government versus interest 
groups, this hybrid system of interest intermediation has distinct properties. Rent-seeking 
is internal to a broader party-client network and develops on the basis of recurrent 
reciprocity there. The context of interactions and negotiations is configured by close ties 
between client groups and the party. Organized clients have overlapping identities: 
through the unions, they can demand accountability from the patron over the provision of 
club goods, but they remain accountable as individual clients for their political behaviour. 
This strengthens their position as clients compared to the typical patron-client relationship 
but limits the autonomy of the labour unions they inhabit; how far they can go in 
contesting policy proposals, especially those that do not directly threaten their status as 
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client groups. Clientelist ties favour moderation, mutual accommodation and policy 
compromise as the optimal strategies for both patron parties and the organized client 
groups. As a result, the source of resistance to policy-making is found in the key position 
of client groups at the heart the party system as vital campaign resources for individual 
patrons and the party as a whole.  
 
The symbiotic relationship between patrons and organized clients also has noticeable 
implications for policy-making. The government party's autonomy from client groups and 
its scope to shift social alliances or forge new ones to promote new policies is 
considerably more limited in a clientelist system than in the typical interest-group 
framework. A patron party in government values its client groups not merely as voters but 
also as active members of its broader support network. It must adjust its policies to 
safeguard their privileges or risk undermining its cohesion and mobilization capacity and 
triggering defections that could strengthen its political rivals. These considerations 
introduce a 'clientelist bias' in the design of economic reforms, which is likely to be 
resilient even under pressing economic conditions and strong international commitments. 
Yet, unlike social democratic unionism, the nature of concessions to client groups is 
highly particularistic and fragmented. This means that clientelist bias can include 
economic policies that diffuse the cost of adjustment across the general population. 
 
Observation of settings outside Greece may also indicate comparable patterns of co-
optation and confrontation between clientelist parties and affiliated unions in view of 
necessitated reforms under an economic crisis, and can trace their political consequences  
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(in Latin America and the Caribbean, see George 2003: 9-10, 21-22; Taylor 2004:220). In 
Latin America, following a strategy of co-optation of labour unions by clientelist parties 
during a period of protectionist policies, reformist governments faced the dilemma of how 
to promote deep-cutting structural reforms to deal with the economic crisis. Governments 
resorted to ‘populist’ strategies and traditional patron-client relationships in an effort to 
disentangle from clientelist-corporatist linkages. When Carlos Menem’s radical ‘all or 
nothing’ reform programme caused a clash with the unions in Argentina, Menem opted for 
the substitution of labour-union linkages for direct patronage supply to the urban poor and 
rural constituencies but, despite his second electoral success, this strategy did not prevent 
his defeat by the left-wing section of his own party during his second term (Ronchi 2007: 
13, 16). However, the experience of Argentina also points to the weakened capacity of the 
hitherto co-opted unions to swiftly and successfully thwart deep-cutting reforms at the 
onset (Ronchi 2007: 30). The Mexican and the Argentinean cases suggest that populism, 
charismatic leadership and vertical patronage ties with individual voters (Teichman 1996: 
138-145; Ronchi 2007: 6, 23-26, 28) can prolong the political sustainability of policies 
that hurt organized client groups but cannot prevent, in the longer term, the demise of the 
parties that pursue them.  
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 See measurements of party patronage in Greece by Pappas and Assimakopoulou (2012) and Afonso et. al. 
2015: 321. See also Lyrintzis 1984; Spourdalakis 1988, Sotiropoulos 1996; Pappas 2003. 
2 This article has drawn on various empirical sources, such as press releases and press commentary, political 
speeches, party manifestoes, policy documents, legislation and economic reports by international 
organizations, as well as secondary resources such as books and journal articles.  
3 Estimates suggested that by the mid-1980s 89 percent of PASOK members had some kind of connection 
with the state sector (Sotiropoulos 1996: 62) and that by the early 2000s, more than 200,000 PASOK 
members served in the broader public sector (Kathimerini, 28/04/2002). 
4 As documented in the press by Nea, 9 January 1989, p.4 and 12 January.1988. p.4.  
5 Minister of Economy Papantoniou praised the unions’ stance as ‘responsible’ (Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia, 
29 July 2001). 
6 Eleftherotypia, 3 August 2001 and 7 August 2001. 
7 See Kathimerini, 1 December 2004, and Vima, 15 November 2009 and 30 March 2010.  
8 See Reports of the Governor of Bank of Greece (years: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001), 
Athens. 
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